to me correct.
Pluhar herself speaks of
empathizing with non-human animals who are in
pain, and that requires anthropomorphizing
such animals to at least some extent.
As
Wittgenstein taught us, the prilnaxy case for
the ascription of pain is the adult hwnan

far as ethical matters are concerned.
Racism, sexism, and speciesism, it's said that
they're all one and the same thing:
taking
mere biology to have ethical import.
It
sounds right, that slogan does. But in actuality, it ignores far too many imp:>rtant and
pervasive facts about ourselves and the world
we live in, facts which sculpt the main contours of our lives and concepts, ethical
concepts included, and provide the very p:>ssibilities for the realization of value and
disvalue in the world.
Whether a biological
difference makes for a valuational difference
and, if so, how it does depend on the nature
of the biological difference, the nature of
the world, and how and how intimately the
biological difference figures into the scheme
of values entire.
Only disembodied spirits
can ignore biology altogether.

being, and the same p:>int holds for all psychological or (intrinsic) moral ascriptions.
Anyone who ascribes rights or intrinsic moral
standing to animals, then, does so on the
basis of the model of an adult human being.
7. This is another of the
alluded to in note 5.
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